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Abstract: The purpose of this research is to determine the direct influence of KAP size, 
company size, audit delay, audit tenure, previous year's audit opinion, opinion 
shopping, financial distress, audit fee, company growth on auditor switching as well as 
through going concern audit opinion as a mediating variable. The data used in this 
research are secondary data involving 104 manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2017. The data used in this study were 
analyzed using partial least square and carried out with the help of software WarpPLS 
5.0. The results show that KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, financial 
distress has a negative effect on auditor switching. Previous year's audit opinion, 
opinion shopping, audit fee, company growth, going concern audit opinion has a 
positive effect on auditor switching. KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, 
previous year's audit opinion, audit fee has a negative effect on ongoing concern audit 
opinion. Opinion shopping, financial distress, company growth has a positive effect on 
ongoing concern audit opinion. The result also shows partial mediation of going 
concern audit opinion on impact KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, 
opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, company growth on auditor switching. 
Our findings provide new empirical evidence supporting the profession's arguments 
that mandatory audit partner rotation is costly to multiple stakeholders, including 
clients, auditors, and investors.  
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Abstrak— Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji pengaruh langsung ukuran KAP, 
ukuran perusahaan, audit delay, audit tenure, opini audit tahun sebelumnya, opinion 
shopping, financial distress, audit fee, pertumbuhan perusahaan terhadap auditor 
switching dengan opini audit going concern sebagai variabel mediasi. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan data sekunder yaitu 104 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa 
Efek Indonesia tahun 2013-2017. Data yang dalam penelitian ini dianalisis 
menggunakan partial least square dan dilakukan dengan software WarpPLS 5.0. 
Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa ukuran KAP, ukuran perusahaan, audit delay, audit 
tenure, financial distress berpengaruh negatif terhadap auditor switching. Opini audit 
tahun sebelumnya, opinion shopping, audit fee, pertumbuhan perusahaan, opini audit 
going concern berpengaruh positif terhadap auditor switching.Ukuran KAP, ukuran 
perusahaan, audit delay, audit tenure, opini audit tahun sebelumnya, audit fee 
berpengaruh negatif terhadap opini audit going concern. Opinion shopping, financial 
distress, pertumbuhan perusahaan berpengaruh positif terhadap opini audit going 
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concern. Hasil penelitian juga menunjukkan opini audit going concern sebagai partial 
mediation pengaruh ukuran KAP, ukuran perusahaan, audit delay, audit tenure, 
opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, pertumbuhan perusahaan terhadap 
auditor switching. Opini audit going concern sebagai full mediation pengaruh opini 
audit tahun sebelumnya terhadap auditor switching. Penelitian kami memberikan bukti 
empiris baru yang mendukung argumen profesi mengenai kewajiban rotasi audit yang 
penting untuk banyak pemegang saham, termasuk klien, auditor, dan investor. 
 
Kata Kunci:Opini audit going concern, pergantian auditor. 
 
1. Introduction 
The close correlation between auditor and client can threaten the auditor's 
independence. In order to avoid this threat, a rule to replace KAP by a company is 
applied. Auditor switching can be happened due to the regulations that require 
companies to do KAP rotation. In the state of Indonesia is governed by the Decree of 
the Minister of Finance Republic of Indonesia number 359/KMK.06/2003 on "Public 
Accountant Services" (article 2) as a change to the decree of the Minister of Finance 
number 423/KMK.06/2002 which as refined in the regulation of the Minister of Finance 
of the Republic of Indonesia number 17/PMK.01/2008 on "Public Accountant 
Services," which governs the rotation obligation of the provision of audit services by 
KAP or public accountant to an entity or client.  
This rotational obligation causes the company to perform auditor switching. 
However, in reality, the company replaces the auditor not due to applicable regulations. 
However, there are other factors that can cause the company to change its audit outside 
of the prevailing regulation. 
The auditor switching can be differentiated into a mandatory turnover and voluntary 
turnover (Adli and Suryani, 2019). The mandatory turnover must be made following 
the Decree of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, while the voluntary 
turnover is done when the client reimburses the audit, no regulation requires to change 
auditors. The two possibilities that occur in this voluntary turnover are when the auditor 
withdraws from the assignment it receives, or the client replaces the auditor for the 
services provided. 
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Elder et al. (2015) found a significant positive effect between KAP size and auditor 
switching using companies sample in Florida. Aroh et al. (2016) found a significant 
negative effect between KAP size and auditor switching of 182 companies sample that 
listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Brown and Knechel (2016) found a significant 
negative effect between company size and auditor switching using sample data of 
Compustat. Huang (2018) found a significant positive effect between company size and 
auditor switching using a sample of 1000 American companies. 
Another factor that causes companies to do auditor switching is auditor opinion. 
The auditor's opinion can attract investors to invest capital in the company. If the 
auditor's opinion can not be able to fulfill the expectation of the company, for example, 
the company gets going concern audit opinion so that it will trigger opinion shopping. 
Newton et al. (2016) found a significant negative effect between opinion shopping and 
auditor switching using sample data of Compustat, Audit Analytics, and CRSP. Chen 
et al. (2018) found a significant positive effect between opinion shopping and auditor 
switching using company samples in the US. 
The company that conducts auditor switching also makes sure the appropriateness 
of size between KAP and their company. Clients who want to improve their company 
image and attract investors will conduct auditor switching to obtain a better audit 
quality. Timeliness of financial statements is one of consideration in the decision 
making of information users. Late reporting will also make the investors think it is a 
bad signal for the company. Due to this factor, independent auditors are also required 
to produce quality audit reports and opinions on time. Sharma et al. (2017) found a 
significant positive effect between audit delay and auditor switching using a sample of 
public companies in the US. Dong et al. (2018) found a significant negative effect 
between audit delay and auditor switching using 103,482 companies sample of 
Compustat. 
In financial distress condition, the company also considers the audit quality due to 
many companies choose to do auditor switching to another KAP for having better audit 
quality than previous KAP. Chadegani et al. (2011) stated that the perception of 
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expensive KAP would determine client success. Management also requires auditors 
who are more qualified and meet the demands of the company's rapid growth. If it fails, 
the company will replace the existing auditor. Safriliana et al. (2018) found a significant 
negative effect between financial distress and auditor switching using 1,926 companies 
sample in Indonesia. Aroh et al. (2017) did not find any effect of financial distress and 
auditor switching using 182 companies sample that listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange.  
Based on the previous research, the inconsistencies of findings still exist. It will 
encourage researchers to use other variables that can mediate the correlation between 
KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, previous year's audit opinion, 
opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, company growth on auditor switching 
by combining going concern audit opinion as mediating variable. The background of 
auditor switching starts to discuss due to the scandal that was revealed from one of 
Arthur Anderson's public accounting firms America in 2001. 
Based on the previous phenomenon, this research was conducted to re-examine 
whether or not there was the influence of KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit 
tenure, previous year's audit opinion, opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, 
company growth on auditor switching with going concern audit opinion as mediating 
variable for manufacturing companies that listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-
2017. 
The data used in this study were analyzed using partial least square and carried out 
with the help of software WarpPLS 5.0. Based on the results of analysis and testing, it 
showed that KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, previous year's audit 
opinion, opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, company growth have a 
significant effect on auditor switching and going concern audit opinion. For companies 
who want to change auditors or KAP should consider more of the decision because the 
audit report given by the auditor about the fairness of the company's financial statements 
will determine the company's survival because it is very related to stakeholders. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development  
Agency theory is the rationale for understanding the concept of auditor switching. 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that agency theory is a theory about human being will take 
action based on their interests (self-interest). The use of reputable auditors is that one-
way management can meet the interests of stakeholders and parties in the company. 
Substitute management will usually implement new accounting methods so that the new 
management expected to cooperate with the new public accounting firms and expected 
to have audit opinion as a management notion.  
The client tends to wish to obtain unqualified opinions from the KAP on their 
audited financial statements. Companies that are given going concern audit opinions 
cause conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest can be explained between conducting 
auditors switching or staying committed with the old auditor in the situation of the 
company obtaining a going concern audit opinion. The decision taken by management 
is doing auditor switching. Auditor switching is one of the mechanisms that can be done 
to minimize conflicts between agents and principals and to foster trust with each other.  
The company management is the party with accurate information about company 
value that is unknown by investors. Information by company management consists of 
financial statements. Investors in the capital market need complete, relevant, accurate, 
and timely information as analysis on investment decision making (Sharma et al., 2017). 
The signal theory states that clients conduct auditor switching when they want to convey 
a signal to the public about the quality and reliability of their financial statements.  
According to Khasharmeh (2015), large companies have a greater amount of audit 
fees than small companies. Moreover, after controlling audit risk, client company size, 
and audit complexity, there is an additional fee based on auditor identity—the effort to 
determine whether or not the fee due to unsuccessful higher audit quality. Deep pockets 
theory confirms that the reputation of public accounting firms turns out to have an 
influence on the audited company, due to the larger public accounting firms, the higher 
fee required. In addition, it is one of the reasons for develop companies that prefer Non-
Big Four public accounting firms due to its cost. 
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2.1 Auditor Switching 
The Minister of Finance regulation Number 17 / PMK.01 / 2008 about "Public 
Accountant Services." The changes are: firstly, the provision of general audit services 
for 6 (six) consecutive years by the accounting firm and 3 (three) consecutive years by 
the public accountant to the same client (article 3 paragraph 1). Secondly, public 
accountants and accounting firms may accept assignments again after one financial 
year, not providing audit services to the client above (article 3, paragraphs 2, and 3). 
The limitation of regulation has been conducted to make auditors and clients have no 
dependency on each other, so that audit quality is maintained with the results audit 
opinions objectively. The substitution of public accounting firms by clients is one way 
to improve public accounting firms' independence. 
The auditor switching is done with consideration because it will have a big impact 
on companies such as investor confidence level. The auditor switching is mandatory 
and voluntary (Adli and Suryani, 2019). Mandatory turnover is done because 
government regulations are governing the obligation of auditors rotation. If the change 
is voluntary, then the causal factors can come from the client-side such as financial 
distress, failed management, ownership change, Initial Public Offering, company size, 
company growth, and others; and from the auditor's side such as audit fee, audit delay, 
audit tenure, audit opinion, KAP size, audit quality, and others. 
2.2 Going Concern Audit Opinion 
SPAP - PSA No. 30 SA Section 341 (2011) states that "going concern audit opinion 
is audit opinion issued by the auditor to evaluate whether or not there is doubt about the 
entity's ability to preserve its existence inappropriate time, no more than a year since 
audited financial statements." It can be concluded that auditors will offer going concern 
audit opinion if there is doubt in the audit process conditions or events that threaten the 
organization or company. 
KAP Size (Public Accounting Firms Size) 
According to Defond et al. (2018), KAP expertise is one of the attributes in large 
KAP services. The expertise factor will determine auditor changes by the company so 
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that the company prefers large KAP. Big Four KAP is KAP that has higher expertise 
and a better reputation than Non-Big Four KAP. 
2.3 Company Size 
Company size is a parameter used by companies to determine the size of the 
company as a small or large company (Mo et al., 2016). It can be seen from the total 
assets, the number of sales, the market value of shares, and capital. 
2.4 Audit Delay 
The financial statements need to be delivered on time to be useful for the users in 
decision making. The audit delay is the days' number between the date of financial 
statements to the date of the signed auditor's report (Dong et al., 2018). 
2.5 Audit Tenure 
Tenure audit is the length of correlation with auditor-client status between public 
accounting firm or external auditor and a company. Overseas governments usually 
recommend that audit tenure be maintained not to exceed four years, which means after 
four years the client works with KAP, then in the fifth year, the company is 
recommended to have a new KAP to audit the company (Dhaliwal et al., 2015). 
2.6    The Previous Year's Audit Opinion 
The auditor's opinion is the conclusion of the audit process conducted by an 
independent auditor on the client's financial statements about the fairness of financial 
statements by management in all material respects based on accounting principles that 
generally accepted (Salawu et al., 2017). The auditor's opinion is included in an audit 
report.  
2.7    Opinion Shopping 
Opinion shopping is conducted by companies or organizations to avoid going 
concern audit opinion. Companies can change auditors (auditor switching) to avoid 
receiving a going-concern audit opinion. Lennox (2002) states that the change of 
auditors named opinion shopping. 
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2.8   Financial Distress 
Financial distress is a company condition that faces financial difficulties (Cao et 
al., 2017). In this research, the financial distress variable is proxied by the DER (Debt 
to Equity Ratio) ratio. The DER ratio is calculated by comparing total debt and total 
equity. DER ratio above 100% is one indicator of the worst financial performance so 
that the company will have financial distress. 
2.9    Audit Fee 
Audit fees are money rewards obtained by accountants and public accounting firms 
from their clients for audit services provided based on loading, time, and costs used by 
accountants to apply their expertise (Sharma et al., 2017).  
2.10 Company Growth 
According to Ettredge et al. (2017), states that good companies (healthy) have high 
profitability and tend to have reasonable financial statements so that the potential to get 
good opinions will be greater than companies that have low profitability. In this 
research, the ratio of earnings growth to measure clients' ability in company growth. 
2.11 Hypothesis Development 
The Direct and Indirect Relationship of KAP Size on Auditor Switching 
KAP's reputation is one of the factors that trigger auditors to provide going-
concern audit opinions. KAP's reputation will bet if the auditor does not provide going 
concern audit opinion when the company is doubtful to survive. KAP included in the 
big four is considered to issue opinions as they are, whether or not the company will 
get going concern audit opinion or non-going concern audit opinion. KAP size is related 
to the auditor's reputation; for example, if the auditor issues an inappropriate opinion, 
it can affect his credibility and reputation as an auditor. A company will choose high 
credibility KAP to improve the credibility of the financial statements on the external 
side as users of financial statements. Krishnan (1994), Defond and Subramanyam 
(1998), and Defond et al. (2018) found a significant negative effect between KAP size 
and going concern audit opinion.  
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Based on the opinion above, it can be concluded that companies prefer large KAPs 
that are with higher quality and good reputation compared to small KAPs. Khasharmeh 
(2015), Aroh et al. (2016), and Gharibi and Geraeely (2016) found a significant negative 
effect between KAP size and auditor switching. Companies that have used large KAP 
services are less likely to change KAPs due to investors tend to be more confident and 
trustworthy if large KAPs audit the company's financial statements. Therefore, 
researchers are interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
H1a:  KAP size has a significant negative effect on auditor switching. 
H1b:  KAP size has a significant negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. 
H1c:  KAP size affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
The Direct and Indirect Relationship of Company Size on Auditor Switching 
The size of a company indicates the size to determine whether it is a small company 
or a large company. Auditors often issue going-concern audit opinions on small 
companies, due to the auditor believes that large companies can solve financial 
difficulties better than small companies. The bigger the company size, the smaller the 
possibility of the auditor giving a going concern audit opinion. Mutchler et al. (1997) 
and Mo et al. (2016) found a significant negative effect between company size and 
going concern audit opinion.  
The size of the company can be known by indicators such as total assets, total sales, 
average total sales, and average total assets. The larger audits, due to the complexity of 
the company's operations and improve separation between management and ownership, 
need KAP that can reduce agency costs. It can be concluded that large companies have 
a lower tendency for auditor switching than small companies. Krishnan (1994), Defond 
and Subramanyam (1998), Fiolleau et al. (2013), and Brown and Knechel (2016) found 
a significant negative effect between firm size and auditor switching. Therefore, 
researchers are interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
H2a:  Company size has a significant negative effect on auditor switching. 
H2b:  Company size has a significant negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. 
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H2c:  Company size affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
Direct and Indirect Relationship of Audit Delay on Auditor Switching 
Audit delay is the total days at the end of the accounting period until the 
publishment of the audit report. The auditor always gives going concern audit opinion 
when the audit report is delayed. Lennox (2002) indicates the possibilities of audit 
report late publishment can be caused by auditor doing more testing, a manager may 
negotiate with the auditor, and auditor slows the opinion publishment by hoping that 
the management can solve the problem that is being faced so it can avoid the going 
concern audit opinion. Blankley et al. (2014) and Chan et al. (2015) found the 
significant negative influence between audit delay and going concern audit opinion. 
An audit task completion that takes too long will result in a delay in publishing 
financial statements to the capital market, so it affects the auditor switching. The longer 
the time needed for the auditor to complete the audit, the more likely the company to 
replace the auditor. Whitworth and Lambert (2014) and Dong et al. (2018) state that 
audit delay influences significant negative towards auditor switching. Therefore, 
researchers are interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
H3a:  Audit delay has a significant negative effect on auditor switching. 
H3b:  Audit delay has a significant negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. 
H3c:  Audit delay affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
Direct and indirect Relationship of Audit Tenure on Auditor Switching 
Audit tenure is the period or length of time that an agreement exists between a 
public accounting firm (KAP) with the same auditee. The long working period between 
the auditor and the auditee can make the auditor too comfortable with the auditee and 
not adjusting the audit procedures that can reflect business changes and related risks. 
This causes the auditor to be less skeptical and vigilant in evaluating and obtaining 
evidence, so it can be said that the audit tenure can also affect the independence of the 
auditor, so the possibility to give a going concern opinion will be difficult. Gul et al. 
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(2011) and Blandon and Bosch (2015) found a significant negative influence between 
audit tenure and going concern audit opinion. 
However, when the auditor has a long time contract with the client, it will stimulate 
more comprehension about the client's financial conditions, they will tend to be easier 
to detect going concern problem. The quality of financial reports is lower in short KAP 
tenure than in medium KAP tenure. Large audit firms such as the Big Four will have a 
longer audit contract period compared to smaller audit companies such as non-Big Four. 
The difference in tenure length between the two types of audit firms can affect auditor 
switching. Gul et al. (2009) and Dhaliwal et al. (2015) found a significant negative 
influence between audit tenure and auditor switching. Therefore, researchers are 
interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
H4a:  Audit tenure has a significant negative effect on auditor switching. 
H4b:  Audit tenure has a significant negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. 
H4c:  Audit tenure affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
Direct and Indirect Relationship of Previous Year’s Audit Opinion on Auditor 
Switching 
The audit opinion is the opinion given by the auditor on the results of evaluating a 
company's financial reports. Previous year audit opinion happens if the auditee who 
received going concern audit opinion in the previous year will be considered to have a 
problem, so it has a greater possibility for the auditor to issue going concern audit 
opinion in the current year. 
Puji (2007), Erly and Elok (2012), and Salawu et al. (2017) found a significant 
negative effect between the previous year audit opinion and going concern audit 
opinion. The manager believes that unfavorable audit opinions will affect stock prices 
and financing capacity so that qualified opinions will likely influence the company's 
decision to end the contract with the auditor. Thus, it can be concluded, companies that 
get a fair opinion with the exception (qualified opinion) on their financial reports are 
likely to replace.  
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According to Stanisic et al. (2014) research, qualified audit opinion has a positive 
influence on the tendency of auditor turnover. However, it is not proven that companies 
that receive qualified opinions will receive better opinions after they changed auditors. 
Management will dismiss its auditor if the auditor gives the company unexpected 
opinion on its financial reports and hopes to get a softer auditor. Heliodoro et al. (2015) 
and Gharibi and Geraeely (2016) also find a significant positive influence between the 
previous year's audit opinion and auditor switching. Therefore, researchers are 
interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
H5a: The previous year’s audit opinion has a significant positive effect on auditor 
switching. 
H5b: The previous year’s audit opinion has a significant negative effect on ongoing 
concern audit opinion. 
H5c: Previous year’s audit opinion affects auditor switching through going concern 
audit opinion. 
Direct and Indirect Relationship of Opinion Shopping on Auditor Switching 
A manager who has the desire to achieve the set targets and the need to maintain 
the going concern of the company will encourage managers to practice opinion 
shopping. The way that a company can do opinion shopping is to replace its auditors 
with new auditors who are likely to give good opinions. Chen et al. (2016) and Choi et 
al. (2018) found a significant positive influence between opinion shopping and going 
concern audit opinion. 
According to Lennox (2000), there are two key findings to predict opinion shopping 
practice. First, auditor changes occur more frequently after the company receives a 
going concern audit opinion. Second, auditor changes that occur increase the occurrence 
of changes in audit opinion. Companies that replace auditors (auditor switching) reduce 
the likelihood of getting an unwanted audit opinion than companies that do not change 
auditors. Dodgson et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2018) finds a significant positive 
influence between opinion shopping and auditor switching. Therefore, researchers are 
interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
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H6a:  Opinion shopping has a significant positive effect on auditor switching. 
H6b: Opinion shopping has a significant positive effect on ongoing concern audit 
opinion. 
H6c:  Opinion shopping affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
Direct and Indirect Relationship of Financial Distress on Auditor Switching 
The health level of a company can be seen from the company's financial condition. 
In a company with a good financial condition, auditors tend not to issue going concern 
audit opinion. The better the company's financial condition, the less likely the auditor 
will give a going-concern audit opinion. Soewiyanto (2012) and Cao et al. (2017) found 
a significant positive influence between financial distress and going concern audit 
opinion. 
The client's financial position has an essential role in making decisions to keep the 
KAP. In difficult circumstances in financial terms, companies will tend to move to 
another KAP. According to Safriliana et al. (2018), financial difficulties are not a factor 
causing companies to do auditor switching. This is because most of the companies 
sampled use non-Big Four KAPs, thus switching auditors to Big Four KAPs will 
actually make it more difficult for the company's financial condition due to an increase 
in audit services. Hudaib and Cooke (2005) and Safriliana et al. (2018) found a 
significant negative influence between financial distress and auditor switching. 
Therefore, researchers are interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
H7a:  Financial distress has a significant negative effect on auditor switching. 
H7b: Financial distress has a significant positive effect on ongoing concern audit 
opinion. 
H7c:  Financial distress affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
Direct and Indirect Relationship of Audit Fee on Auditor Switching 
Audit fees are fees received by auditors that come from payments by management 
or clients for audit services that have been done (Hartadi, 2012). Gammal (2012) proves 
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that Multinational companies and banks in Lebanon prefer to pay large audit fees with 
the reason that they are looking for auditors who can produce quality auditing. Large 
companies offer higher audit fees than those offered by small companies. Concerning 
the significant loss of audit fees, auditors may be hesitant to issue going concern audit 
opinions to the large companies. Choi et al. (2010) and Hapsoro and Santoso (2018) 
found a significant negative influence between audit fees and going concern audit 
opinion. 
If the audit fee desired by the auditor is large enough so that there is no agreement 
between the client and the auditor regarding the amount of the audit fee provided, then 
this will result in auditor switching. Sharma et al. (2017) state that when company 
managers feel displeased and not suitable for the auditor audit fee, then the management 
will try to get the auditor that is suitable with the audit fee offered by the company by 
changing auditors. Khasharmeh (2015) and Sharma et al. (2017) finds a significant 
positive influence between audit fee and auditor switching. Therefore, researchers are 
interested in taking these following hypothesis: 
H8a:  Audit fee has a significant positive effect on auditor switching. 
H8b:  Audit fee has a significant negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. 
H8c:  Audit fee affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
Direct and Indirect Relationship of Company Growth on Auditor Switching 
According to Ettredge et al. (2017), states that a good (healthy) company has high 
profitability and tends to have reasonable financial reports. Companies that have 
positive earnings growth indicate that the company can maintain the viability of its 
business (i.e., going concern), so the less likely the auditor to issue going concern audit 
opinion. Otherwise, a company that has a negative earnings growth indicates that the 
company cannot maintain its business continuity (i.e., going concern), so the more 
likely the auditor to issue going concern audit opinion. Erly and Elok (2012) and 
Ettredge et al. (2017) found a significant negative influence between company growth 
and going concern audit opinion. 
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Rapid business growth is generally followed by an increase in the need for 
independent audit firms to reduce agency costs and increase the need for non-audit 
services in expanding their companies. With the growth of the company, the level and 
capability of the company are also growing. With the increase in the company's ability, 
it is expected that it must be followed by changes in the auditors used. In addition, to 
increase the company's reputation with a big company image, it uses a large auditor as 
well, so that it becomes more valuable for the investor. Management requires higher 
quality auditors who are able to meet the demands of the rapid growth of the companies. 
Nazri et al. (2012) and Brown and Knechwl (2016) found a significant positive 
influence between company growth and auditor switching. If this cannot be met, the 
company will likely replace the existing auditor. Therefore, researchers are interested 
in taking these following hypothesis: 
H9a:  Company growth has a significant positive effect on auditor switching. 
H9b: Company growth has a significant negative effect on ongoing concern audit 
opinion. 
H9c:  Company growth affects auditor switching through going concern audit opinion. 
 
Direct Relationship of Going Concern Audit Opinion on Auditor Switching 
Audit going concern opinion is an opinion concerning company certainty in 
maintaining its business continuity issued by the auditor. Going concern audit opinion 
indicates that there is a company risk that cannot be maintained in business or cannot 
maintain its business continuity in the future. Khasharmeh (2015) stated that the auditee 
has a tendency to change the auditor because it obtains an opinion, which is not in line 
with company expectation, which is going concern audit opinion. Carcello and Neal 
(2003) and Khasharmeh (2015) found a significant positive effect between going 
concern audit opinion and auditor switching. Based on that formulation, the following 
hypothesis is formulated:  
H10: Going concern audit opinion has a significant positive effect on auditor switching. 
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3. Research Method 
The type of this research is quantitative with an associative research method. 
Associative research aims to find out correlational relation also causal relation between 
variables (Sugiyono, 2016:21). 
We used the following research model to test the hypothesis above: 
ASW = ϒ1. KAP+ ϒ2. CMP+ ϒ3. ADY + ϒ4. ATN + ϒ5. OPN+ ϒ6. OPS + ϒ7. FDS + 
ϒ8. FEE +    ϒ9. GWH + ϒ10. GCR + ε1 
 
GCR = ϒ1. KAP+ ϒ2. CMP+ ϒ3. ADY + ϒ4. ATN + ϒ5. OPN+ ϒ6. OPS +  ϒ7.  
FDS + ϒ8. FEE + ϒ9. GWH + ε2 
Table I 
Variable Description 
 
Variable 
Type 
Variable Variable description 
Dependent Auditor switching Dummy variable, 1 if a company which 
conducts the substitution of an auditor from 
the previous year and other 0.  
Mediation Going concern audit opinion Dummy variable, 1 if the company accepts 
going concern audit opinion and other 0. 
Independent KAP size  Dummy variable, 1 if the company is 
audited by KAP the Big Four and other 0.  
 Company size Natural logarithm from a total asset. 
 Audit delay Dummy variable, 1 if the company delivers 
financial reports before 90 days after year-
end and other 0. 
 Audit tenure Dummy variable, 1 for relation of3 years 
auditor-client or more and other 0. 
 Previous year’s audit opinion Dummy variable, 1 if a company gets 
unqualified opinion and modified 
unqualified opinion and other 0. 
 Opinion shopping Dummy variable, 1 for company audited by 
a different independent auditor for the next 
year after the company gets going concern 
audit opinion and other 0. 
 Financial distress Dummy variable, 1 if a company has Debt 
Ratio to Equity Ratio above 100% and other 
0. 
 Audit fee Natural logarithm from the professional fee. 
 Company growth (net profit (t) – net profit (t-1)) / net profit 
(t-1) 
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Research population and sample. The research population is a manufacturing 
company listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017, amounting to 146 
companies. The research data collection technique uses nonprobability sampling with a 
purposive sampling method such as manufacturing companies in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange there are samples 104 companies x 5 years = 520 observational data. 
Type and source of data. This research uses secondary data or data obtained from 
financial and non-financial information published on the website of the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (www.idx.co.id) or company website. 
Analysis model and hypothesis testing. The data used in this study were analyzed 
using partial least square and carried out with the help of software WarpPLS 5.0. The 
data analysis method in this research is partial least square (PLS) conducted through 
two stages, which are structural model evaluation (outer model) and measurement 
model evaluation (inner model). Outer model is evaluated with three types of tests, 
which are first, convergent validity: the outer model has fulfilled the requirement of 
convergent validity to build reflective when the loading value is > 0,70 and significance 
of p-value < 0.05. Indicator of loading value< other models will erase 0,40, and loading 
value between 0,40 and 0,70 will be analyzed for the effect of indicator removal towards 
average variance expected (AVE) and composite reliability, where AVE minimum is 
0,50 and composite reliability 0,70 (Sholihin and Ratmono, 2013:66). Second, 
discriminant validity: to conduct a discriminant validity test, which is by seeing cross-
loading value for each variable, must be > 0,70. The other way is by comparing the 
square root of AVE for each construct with construct value in the model (Ghozali and 
Latin, 2017:87). The square root of AVE must bigger than other construct values. Third, 
composite reliability: measure the actual value of the reliability of a construct. Rule of 
thumb of alpha value or composite reliability must bigger than 0,7 even though the value 
0,6 can be accepted (Abdillah and Jogiyanto, 2016:62). 
After the evaluation of the outer model, the inner model is evaluated using R2.R2 
0.75, 0.45, and 0.25 values can be concluded that the model is strong, moderate, and 
weak (Ghozali and Latan, 2017:78). How good the observational value is generated by 
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model and parameter estimation in research using predictive relevance (Q2). Value Q2> 
0 shows that model has predictive relevance (Ghozali and Latan, 2017:94). 
In addition, fit model evaluation is conducted to find out a model which is fitted 
with its original data and measure model quality. This research uses four fit measures, 
which are average path coefficient (APC), average R2 (ARS), average adjusted R2 
(AARS), and average block variance factor (AVIF). APC, ARS, and AARS measure 
average of path coefficient, R2, and adjusted R2 values obtained in the model. Cut-off 
P-value for APC, ARS, and AARS recommended as the fit model indication is ≤ 0,05. 
AVIF is used to test the collinearity problem in the PLS model, and the value 
recommended must be ≤ 3,3 with the assumption of many construct/variables in the 
model are measured using two or more indicators (Ghozali dan Latan, 2017:96).  
A hypothesis test is made based on research purpose, which is to asses the effect of 
independent variables separately. Significance of (two-tailed) in this research is 1% or 
0.01, 5% or 0.05, and 10% or 0.10. If the p-value is bigger than α (0.01, 0.05, 0.10), 
then Ho is accepted, and Ha is rejected. If the p-value is smaller or the same with α 
(0.01, 0.05, 0.10), then Ho is rejected, and Ha is accepted.  
There are two types of the test; the first test, the direct effect which compares p-
value (the result of model evaluation measurement) with the level of significance or R2. 
When the p-value resulted from the PLS process is bigger than the level of significance 
used, then there is a significant effect. Second, the indirect effect conducted 
simultaneously estimates the indirect effect with the PLS-SEM triangle model. 
Conclusion about mediation is as follows (Sholihin and Ratmono, 2013:57): if path 
coefficient from independent to dependent after mediation variable is still significant 
and has not changed then mediation hypothesis is not supported; if path coefficient from 
independent to dependent after the value of mediation variable is decreased but still 
significant then the form of mediation is partial mediation; if path coefficient from 
independent to dependent after the value of mediation variable is decreased and 
becomes insignificant then the form of mediation is full mediation.  
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Subject Overview and Research Object 
The subject of this research is all manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) period 2013-2017. Based on data obtained from Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX), which fulfilled criteria as sample amounting 104 companies from146 
companies (Table AI). 
 
4.2. Analysis Model and Hypothesis Test 
Outer model is evaluated with three types of test, which are convergent validity, 
discriminant validity, and composite reliability: 
(1) Convergent validity: from the result of output combined loadings and cross-
loadings it can be seen that indicator reliability from construct former items in 
dimension KAP, CMP, ADY, ATN, OPN, OPS, FDS, FEE, GWH, GCR, and 
ASW are valid with loading factor value resulted > 0.7 and P-value < 0.001 (Table 
AII). 
(2) Discriminant Validity: 
 Seeing the cross-loading value for each variable must > 0,70; comparing the 
result of cross loading in each construct, all variable fulfilled criteria of 
discriminant validity where the relation of the construct with its variable is 
bigger than variable with other constructs (Table AIII).  
 Comparing the square root of AVE for each construct with construct value in 
the model. The square root of AVE must bigger than other construct values 
(Table AIV). 
(3) Composite reability: resulted by each construct of dimension is also very good 
which is > 0.7 so that it fulfills internal consistency reliability which are 1.000 
(KAP), 1.000 (CMP), 1.000 (ADY), 1.000 (ATN), 1.000 (OPN), 1.000 (OPS), 
1.000 (FDS), 1.000 (FEE), 1.000 (GWH), 1.000 (GCR), 1.000 (ASW). 
The inner model is evaluated with R2 and Q2 for each endogenous variable can 
be seen in Table AV. For H1c, the variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor 
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switching have R2 of 0.007 and 0.051. This means that the variable of going concern 
audit opinion can be explained by 0.7% by KAP size and variable of auditor switching 
can be explained 5.1% by KAP size and going concern audit opinion. For H2c, the 
variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor switching have R2 of 0.001 and 
0.018. This means that the variable of going concern audit opinion can be explained by 
0.1% by company size and variable of auditor switching can be explained 1.8% by 
company size and going concern audit opinion. 
For H3c, the variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor switching have R2 
of 0.002 and 0.018. This means that the variable of going concern audit opinion can be 
explained by 0.2% by audit delay and variable of auditor switching can be explained 
1.8% by audit delay and going concern audit opinion. For H4c, the variable of going 
concern audit opinion and auditor switching has R2 of 0.007 and 0.095. This means that 
the variable of going concern audit opinion can be explained by 0.7% by audit tenure, 
and the variable of auditor switching can be explained by 9.5% by audit tenure and 
going concern audit opinion. 
For H5c, the variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor switching have R2 
of 0.309 and 0.010. This means that the variable of going concern audit opinion can be 
explained by 30.9% by the previous year’s audit opinion and variable of auditor 
switching can be explained 1.0% by the previous year’s audit opinion and going concern 
audit opinion. For H6c, the variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor 
switching have R2 of 0.071 and 0.074. This means that the variable of going concern 
audit opinion can be explained by 7.1% by opinion shopping and variable of auditor 
switching can be explained 7.4% by opinion shopping and going concern audit opinion.  
For H7c, the variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor switching have R2 
of 0.034 and 0.014. This means that the variable of going concern audit opinion can be 
explained by 3.4% by financial distress, and the variable of auditor switching can be 
explained by 1.4% by financial distress and going concern audit opinion. For H8c, the 
variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor switching have R2 of 0.002 and 
0.012. This means that the variable of going concern audit opinion can be explained by 
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0.2% by audit fee and variable of auditor switching can be explained 1.2% by audit fee 
and going concern audit opinion.  
For H9c, the variable of going concern audit opinion and auditor switching have R2 
of 0.003 and 0.010. This means that the variable of going concern audit opinion can be 
explained by 0.3% by company growth and variable of auditor switching can be 
explained 1.0% by company growth and going concern audit opinion. Based on the 
calculation result of predictive validity (Q2) shows that value Q2 for the variable of 
auditor switching in H1c is 0.051, H2c is 0.025, H3c is 0.019, H4c is 0.096, H5c is 
0.011, H6c is 0.075, H7c is 0.015, H8c is 0.014, H9c is 0.011 which have fulfilled 
criteria of good predictive validity which is Q2> 0. 
Table AVI shows the result of the fit model evaluation to measure model quality. 
APC, ARS, AARS in H1c, H2c, H3c, H4c, H5c, H6c, H7c, H8c, H9c have p-value ≤ 
0.05, so that it fulfilled criteria of goodness of fit model. AVIF in H1c, H2c, H3c, H4c, 
H5c, H6c, H7c, H8c, H9c has p-value ≤ 3.3 so that there is no collinearity problem 
between the variable in the model. 
Fit model test to determine the model feasibility. TableAVI shows the result of the 
fittest for H1c, H2c, H3c, H4c, H5c, H6c, H7c, H8c, H9c. Based on table AV, H1c, 
H2c, H3c, H4c, H5c, H6c, H7c, H8c, H9c fulfilled criteria of goodness of fit model. 
APC, ARS, and AARS have p-value ≤ 0.05. AVIF value for H1c, H2c, H3c, H4c, H5c, 
H6c, H7c, H8c, H9c is ≤ 3.3 means that there is no collinearity problem between 
construct/variable in the model.  
Testing to analyze whether the mediation variable (going concern audit opinion) 
affects auditor switching shows that the path coefficient value of GCR-ASW is 0.047 
significant in 0.10. It means that going concern audit opinion has a positive effect on 
auditor switching. The procedure of going concerning audit opinion hypothesis testing 
as mediation variable between KAP size and auditor switching is by two steps as 
follows. 
First, conducting estimation of direct effect to KAP size on auditor switching 
without entering the mediation variable. This direct effect must be significant. This stage 
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has been conducted when conducting testing of H1a significant to<0.001 and H1b 
significant to 0.100 so that it shows that there is a significant direct effect. Second, 
conducting estimation of indirect effect simultaneously with triangle PLS-SEM model, 
which are KAP-ASW, KAP-GCR, and GCR-ASW. The requirement of mediation 
effect, which must be fulfilled, is that the path of KAP-GCR and GCR-ASW must be 
significant. 
Based on these provisions, it can be concluded that going concern audit opinion is 
a partial mediation in the relationship between KAP size and auditor switching, so H1c 
is supported. From table AVI, hypotheses H2a, H3a, H4a, H5a, H6a, H7a, H8a, H9a, 
H10 are also supported which shows the direct effect of company size, audit delay, audit 
tenure, previous year's audit opinion, opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, 
company growth on auditor switching is significant. Hypotheses H2b, H3b, H4b, H5b, 
H6b, H7b, H8b, H9b are supported, which shows the direct effect of company size, audit 
delay, audit tenure, previous year's audit opinion, opinion shopping, financial distress, 
audit fee, company growth ongoing concern audit opinion significantly. 
For the indirect effect test, it can be seen in table AVII, the H2c hypothesis (CMP-
GCR-ASW path) is significant (p <0.01), which states that company size indirectly 
influences the auditor switching with going concern audit opinion as a mediating 
variable proven significant. The H3c hypothesis (ADY-GCR-ASW path), which states 
that audit delay indirectly influences auditor switching with going concern audit opinion 
as a mediating variable proved significant (p <0.01). The H4c hypothesis (ATN-GCR-
ASW path), which states that audit tenure indirectly influences auditor switching with 
going concern audit opinion as a mediating variable proved significant (p <0.01). 
The H5c hypothesis (OPN-GCR-ASW path), which states that the previous year’s 
audit opinion indirectly affects auditor switching with going concern audit opinion as a 
mediating variable is not significant (p <0.110). According to Shohilin and Ratmono 
(2013: 57), if the OPN-GCR-ASW path coefficient drops and becomes insignificant, 
then for H5c mediation is full mediation. This shows that when going concern audit 
opinion variables are included in the model, the direct effect of the previous year's audit 
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opinion on auditor switching becomes insignificant. Overall, these results indicate that 
the going concern audit opinion variable fully mediates the influence of the previous 
year's audit opinion on auditor switching.  
The H6c hypothesis (OPS-GCR-ASW path), which states opinion shopping 
indirectly affects the auditor switching with going concern audit opinion as a mediating 
variable proved significant (p <0.01). The H7c hypothesis (path FDS-GCR-ASW), 
which states that financial distress indirectly affects auditor switching with going 
concern audit opinion as a mediating variable proved significant (p <0.05). 
The H8c hypothesis (path FEE-GCR-ASW), which states that audit fees indirectly 
affect the auditor switching with going concern audit opinion as a mediating variable 
proved significant (p <0.01). The H9c hypothesis (GWH-GCR-ASW path), which states 
that company growth indirectly affects auditor switching with going concern audit 
opinion as a mediating variable proved significant (p <0.10). 
KAP size had a significant negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. The 
results of this study are consistent with the research of Krishnan (1994), Defond and 
Subramanyam (1998), and Defond et al. (2018). Auditors believe that large companies 
can be more concerned than small companies. Most of the samples in this study were 
large companies that were audited by the Big Four KAP, so there was a little possibility 
of going concern audit opinion. KAP size has a significant negative effect on auditor 
switching. The results of this study are consistent with research by Khasharmeh (2015), 
Aroh et al. (2016), and Gharibi and Geraeely (2016). This is following the deep pocket 
theory, which states that large companies will choose Big Four KAPs to maintain audit 
quality so that the sample chosen is the majority of large companies where it shows that 
companies that have used large KAP services have little possibility to change KAPs. 
The size of KAP in the majority of Big Four KAP research in auditing large companies 
so that there is a little possibility of going concern audit opinion. Therefore, it minimizes 
the company to do auditor switching. 
Company size had a negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. The results 
of this study are consistent with the research of Mutchler et al. (1997) and Mo et al. 
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(2016). Most of the samples in this study were large companies, the less likely the 
auditor will give a going concern audit opinion. Company size has a negative effect on 
auditor switching. The results of this study are consistent with the research of Krishnan 
(1994), Defond and Subramanyam (1998), Fiolleau et al. (2013), and Brown and 
Knechel (2016). The results showed that companies with large total assets still chose 
Big Four KAP as their auditors. This proved the suitability of the size between the KAP 
and its clients. The majority of the research sample consisted of companies with large 
total assets, and the majority had used large KAP services, thereby minimizing the 
tendency to do auditor switching. The size of the company in the majority of research 
is large companies, the less likely it is to get going concern audit opinion, thus 
minimizing auditor switching. 
Audit delay had a negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. The results of 
this study are consistent with the research of Blankley et al. (2014) and Chan et al. 
(2015). The majority of research samples were large companies. Large companies have 
a good control structure, making it easier for audit procedures that will reduce audit 
delay. Timely audit reports indicate the less likely to get going concern audit opinions. 
Audit delay had a negative effect on auditor switching. The results of this study are 
consistent with the research of Whitworth and Lambert (2014) and Dong et al. (2018). 
Large companies that are audited by the Big Four KAP will reduce audit delay, thereby 
minimizing auditor switching. 
Audit tenure had a negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. The results of 
this study are consistent with the research of Gul et al. (2011) and Blandon and Bosch 
(2015). The research sample of the majority of large companies audited by the Big Four 
KAP has a long tenure audit compared to non-Big Four. Long audit tenure will make 
the auditor more familiar with the company's condition so that the less likely the auditor 
will give a going concern audit opinion. Audit tenure had a negative effect on auditor 
switching. The results of this study are consistent with the research of Gul et al. (2009) 
and Dhaliwal et al. (2015). Most of the research samples were large companies that are 
audited by Big Four KAP, where Big Four KAP has a long audit tenure, thereby 
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reducing auditor switching. A long audit tenure will increase a better understanding of 
the client's financial condition so that the smaller the client gets a going concern audit 
opinion. Then a long audit tenure reduces the company doing auditor switching. 
The previous year's audit opinion had a negative effect on the going concern audit 
opinion. The results of this study are consistent with the research of Puji (2007), Erly 
and Elok (2012), and Salawu et al. (2017). The majority of the sample in the study was 
the majority of large companies that get unqualified opinions, so the smaller large 
companies get a going concern audit opinion the following year. The previous year's 
audit opinion had a positive effect on auditor switching. The results of this study are 
consistent with Stanisic et al. (2014), Heliodoro et al. (2015), and Gharibi and Geraeely 
(2016). This showed that the majority of large companies that received unqualified 
opinions in the previous year would conduct auditor switching. This was likely also due 
to a change in management. 
Opinion shopping had a positive effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. The 
results of this study are consistent with research by Chen et al. (2016) and Choi et al. 
(2018). Companies in the research sample conducted opinion shopping to avoid going 
concern audit opinions. Opinion shopping had a positive effect on auditor switching. 
The results of this study are consistent with the research of Dodgson et al. (2017) and 
Chen et al. (2018). This showed that opinion shopping was done by changing auditors 
to reduce the possibility of getting an unwanted audit opinion. 
Financial distress had a positive effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. The 
results of this study are consistent with the research of Soewiyanto (2012) and Cao et 
al. (2017). The sample in this research showed that companies that experience financial 
distress would get going concern audit opinion. Financial distress had a negative effect 
on auditor switching. The results of this study are consistent with the study of Hudaib 
and Cooke (2005) and Safriliana et al. (2018). Observation results showed that sample 
companies that experienced financial difficulties for one or more periods reduced 
auditor switching. Closely related to the signal theory, companies experiencing financial 
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difficulties will reduce the change of auditors to keep giving positive signals to the 
public about the condition of their companies. 
Audit fees had a negative effect on ongoing concern audit opinion. The results of 
this study are consistent with the research of Choi et al. (2010) and Hapsoro and Santoso 
(2018). The majority of research samples were large companies. Large companies offer 
more high audit fees to get quality audits so that smaller companies get a going-concern 
audit opinion. Audit fees had a positive effect on auditor switching. The results of this 
study are consistent with research by Khasharmeh (2015) and Sharma et al. (2017). 
Large companies that do not agree with the audit fee offered by the auditor will do 
auditor switching. High audit fees will reduce going concern audit opinion and have a 
positive effect on auditor switching. 
Company growth had a negative effect on the going-concern audit opinion. The 
results of this study are consistent with the studies of Erly and Elok (2012) and Ettredge 
et al. (2017). The companies in the study sample showed the ability to going concern so 
that the smaller the auditor gave a going concern audit opinion. Company growth had a 
positive effect on auditor switching. The results of this study are consistent with the 
research of Nazri et al. (2012) and Brown and Knechwl (2016). The majority of research 
samples were large companies that show the ability to grow so that they do auditor 
switching to meet the demands of rapid company growth. 
Going concern audit opinion had a positive effect on auditor switching. The results 
of this study are consistent with the research of Carcello and Neal (2003) and 
Khasharmeh (2015). This showed that companies in the study sample would do auditor 
switching if they get going concern audit opinion to get a good opinion so that they can 
attract investors. 
 
5. Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
5.1. Conclusion 
Based on the results of analysis and testing, it showed that KAP size, company 
size, audit delay, audit tenure, previous year's audit opinion, opinion shopping, financial 
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distress, audit fee, company growth have a significant effect on auditor switching and 
going concern audit opinion. In addition, going concern audit opinion also has a positive 
effect on auditor switching and was proven significant. Going concern audit opinion 
can mediate the effect of KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, opinion 
shopping, financial distress, audit fee, company growth on auditor switching with 
partial mediation. Going concern audit opinion can mediate the effect of the previous 
year's audit opinion on auditor switching with full mediation.  
5.2. Implication and Limitation 
This research is expected to have implications in enhancing research on the 
importance of considering auditor turnover due to the discretion of the entity 
determining KAP services. In addition, this research is expected to make a positive 
contribution to supporting government regulations that provide flexibility for 
companies to submit financial information to the public based on auditor 
recommendations.  
Companies that want to change auditors or KAP should consider more of the 
decision because the audit report given by the auditor about the fairness of the 
company's financial statements will determine the company's survival because it is very 
related to stakeholders. For KAP in conducting audits should be professional because 
the professionalism of KAP influences the decision of the company to conduct the 
auditor switching. 
Another implication is the desire to enrich Indonesian literature on factors that 
influence auditor switching and support future research. This study has a limitation that 
is only classifying the size variables of KAP big four and non-big four. Further research 
is suggested to be able to classify the size variables of international KAP, national KAP, 
local KAP, and regional KAP, also using a longer research period, so as to clearly 
indicate the presence of auditor switching.  
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Appendix 1 
Table AI 
Company Sample 
Criteria Amount 
1. Manufacturing companies listed on IDX 146 
2. Financial statement and overall data relating to research variables 
(9) 
are not available in publications for the period of 2013-2017 
3. Manufacturing companies are not consistently listed on IDX f 
rom 2013 to 2017 
(6) 
4. Manufacturing companies have a negative equity book value (27) 
5. Manufacturing companies become a research sample  104 
Source: Data process, 2019 
 
Appendix 2 
Table AII 
Results of combined loadings and cross-loadings factor.  
 KAP CMP ADY ATN OPN OPS FDS FEE 
KA (0.906) 0.176 0.003 0.140 0.030 -0.081 -0.091 0.265 
SIZE 0.149 (0.767) 0.073 0.070 0.035 -0.010 0.094 0.600 
LAG 0.003 0.094 (0.983) 0.026 -0.036 0.018 -0.084 0.061 
TNRE 0.145 0.085 0.025 (0.936) 0.014 -0.085 -0.042 0.035 
OP 0.028 0.038 -0.031 0.012 (0.835) -0.247 -0.131 0.046 
OPSP -0.080 -0.011 0.017 -0.081 -0.265 (0.894) 0.028 -0.027 
DER -0.096 0.117 -0.081 -0.042 -0.149 0.030 (0.949) 0.108 
LNFE 0.223 0.596 0.047 0.029 0.042 -0.023 0.087 (0.761) 
EARN 0.015 0.075 0.051 0.000 0.053 -0.008 -0.008 0.036 
GCAO -0.069 -0.011 -0.009 -0.071 -0.463 0.222 0.154 -0.037 
SWCH -0.189 -0.087 -0.085 -0.269 -0.023 0.243 -0.043 -0.050 
 
Table AII (continued) 
Result of combined loadings and cross-loadings factor  
 GWH GCR ASW P-Value Conclusion 
KA 0.013 -0.075 -0.191 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
SIZE 0.058 -0.010 -0.074 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
LAG 0.051 -0.010 -0.093 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
TNRE 0.000 -0.080 -0.281 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
OP 0.045 -0.465 -0.021 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
OPSP -0.007 0.238 0.242 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
DER -0.008 0.176 -0.045 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
LNFE 0.027 -0.034 -0.043 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
EARN (0.992) 0.058 0.026 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
GCAO 0.049 (0.832) 0.080 <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
SWCH 0.023 0.086 (0.897) <0.001 Meet the convergent validity 
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Appendix 3 
Table AIII 
Comparison of loadings factors of each proxy to latent constructs with other constructs  
   Loading factors to other constructs 
Indicator Loading  KAP CMP ADY ATN OPN OPS FDS 
KA (0.906) >  0.176 0.003 0.140 0.030 -0.081 -0.091 
SIZE (0.767) > 0.149  0.073 0.070 0.035 -0.010 0.094 
LAG (0.983) > 0.003 0.094  0.026 -0.036 0.018 -0.084 
TNRE (0.936) > 0.145 0.085 0.025  0.014 -0.085 -0.042 
OP (0.835) > 0.028 0.038 -0.031 0.012  -0.247 -0.131 
OPSP (0.894) > -0.080 -0.011 0.017 -0.081 -0.265  0.028 
DER (0.949) > -0.096 0.117 -0.081 -0.042 -0.149 0.030  
LNFE (0.761) > 0.223 0.596 0.047 0.029 0.042 -0.023 0.087 
EARN (0.992) > 0.015 0.075 0.051 0.000 0.053 -0.008 -0.008 
GCAO (0.832) > -0.069 -0.011 -0.009 -0.071 -0.463 0.222 0.154 
SWCH (0.897) > -0.189 -0.087 -0.085 -0.269 -0.023 0.243 -0.043 
 
Table AIII (continued) 
Comparison of loadings factors of each proxy to latent constructs with other constructs  
 Loading factors to other constructs   
Indicator FEE GWH GCR ASW Conclusion 
KA 0.265 0.013 -0.075 -0.191 Meet the discriminant validity 
SIZE 0.600 0.058 -0.010 -0.074 Meet the discriminant validity 
LAG 0.061 0.051 -0.010 -0.093 Meet the discriminant validity 
TNRE 0.035 0.000 -0.080 -0.281 Meet the discriminant validity 
OP 0.046 0.045 -0.465 -0.021 Meet the discriminant validity 
OPSP -0.027 -0.007 0.238 0.242 Meet the discriminant validity 
DER 0.108 -0.008 0.176 -0.045 Meet the discriminant validity 
LNFE  0.027 -0.034 -0.043 Meet the discriminant validity 
EARN 0.036  0.058 0.026 Meet the discriminant validity 
GCAO -0.037 0.049  0.080 Meet the discriminant validity 
SWCH -0.050 0.023 0.086  Meet the discriminant validity 
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Appendix 4 
Table AIV 
AVE square root of correlation between latent variables 
 KAP CMP ADY ATN OPN OPS FDS 
KAP (1.000) 0.194 0.003 0.155 0.033 -0.089 -0.101 
CMP 0.194 (1.000) 0.096 0.091 0.045 -0.012 0.123 
ADY 0.003 0.096 (1.000) 0.027 -0.037 0.019 -0.086 
ATN 0.155 0.091 0.027 (1.000) 0.015 -0.091 -0.044 
OPN 0.033 0.045 -0.037 0.015 (1.000) -0.296 -0.156 
OPS -0.089 -0.012 0.019 -0.091 -0.296 (1.000) 0.031 
FDS -0.101 0.123 -0.086 -0.044 -0.156 0.031 (1.000) 
FEE 0.292 0.783 0.062 0.038 0.055 -0.030 0.114 
GWH 0.015 0.075 0.051 0.000 0.054 -0.008 -0.008 
GCR -0.083 -0.013 -0.010 -0.086 -0.556 0.266 0.185 
ASW -0.211 -0.097 -0.094 -0.300 -0.026 0.270 -0.048 
 
Table AIV (continued) 
AVE square root of correlation between latent variables 
 FEE GWH GCR ASW 
KAP 0.292 0.015 -0.083 -0.211 
CMP 0.783 0.075 -0.013 -0.097 
ADY 0.062 0.051 -0.010 -0.094 
ATN 0.038 0.000 -0.086 -0.300 
OPN 0.055 0.054 -0.556 -0.026 
OPS -0.030 -0.008 0.266 0.270 
FDS 0.114 -0.008 0.185 -0.048 
FEE (1.000) 0.036 -0.045 -0.056 
GWH 0.036 (1.000) 0.059 0.026 
GCR -0.045 0.059 (1.000) 0.096 
ASW -0.056 0.026 0.096 (1.000) 
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Appendix 5 
Table AV 
Value of R2 and Q2 
Hypotheses Endogenous variables R2 Q2 
H1c Going concern audit opinion 0.007 0.008 
 Auditor switching 0.051 0.051 
H2c Going concern audit opinion 0.001 0.003 
 Auditor switching 0.018 0.025 
H3c Going concern audit opinion 0.002 0.001 
 Auditor switching 0.018 0.019 
H4c Going concern audit opinion 0.007 0.008 
 Auditor switching 0.095 0.096 
H5c Going concern audit opinion 0.309 0.309 
 Auditor switching 0.010 0.011 
H6c Going concern audit opinion 0.071 0.072 
 Auditor switching 0.074 0.075 
H7c Going concern audit opinion 0.034 0.034 
 Auditor switching 0.014 0.015 
H8c Going concern audit opinion 0.002 0.011 
 Auditor switching 0.012 0.014 
H9c Going concern audit opinion 0.003 0.007 
 Auditor switching 0.010 0.011 
 
Appendix 6 
Table AVI 
Fit model test result  
Hypotheses APC ARS AARS AVIF 
H1c 0.122; p=0.001 0.029; p=0.012 0.026; p=0.013 1.007 
H2c 0.068; p=0.030 0.009; p=0.020 0.006, p=0.022 1.000 
H3c 0.066; p=0.032 0.009; p=0.020 0.006; p=0.022 1.000 
H4c 0.150; p<0.001 0.051; p=0.046 0.049; p=0.050 1.007 
H5c 0.238; p<0.001 0.160; p<0.001 0.157; p<0.001 1.448 
H6c 0.185; p<0.001 0.072; p=0.024 0.070; p=0.028 1.076 
H7c 0.121; p=0.001 0.024; p=0.014 0.021; p=0.015 1.035 
H8c 0.064; p=0.036 0.007; p=0.021 0.004; p=0.023 1.002 
H9c 0.058; p=0.046 0.007; p=0.022 0.004; p=0.023 1.003 
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Appendix 7 
Table AVII 
Direct Effect 
Hypotheses Independent Dependent β-value p-value Conclusion 
H1a KAP size Auditor switching -0.169*** <0.001 Accepted 
H1b KAP size Going concern audit opinion -0.033* 0.100 Accepted 
H2a Company size Auditor switching -0.107*** 0.003 Accepted 
H2b Company size Going concern audit opinion -0.049* 0.100 Accepted 
H3a Audit delay Auditor switching -0.095*** 0.008 Accepted 
H3b Audit delay Going concern audit opinion -0.028** 0.040 Accepted 
H4a Audit tenure Auditor switching -0.244*** <0.001 Accepted 
H4b Audit tenure Going concern audit opinion -0.061** 0.050 Accepted 
H5a Previous year’s audit opinion Auditor switching 0.062** 0.050 Accepted 
H5b Previous year’s audit opinion Going concern audit opinion -0.514*** <0.001 Accepted 
H6a Opinion shopping Auditor switching 0.245*** <0.001 Accepted 
H6b Opinion shopping Going concern audit opinion 0.103*** 0.004 Accepted 
H7a Financial distress Auditor switching -0.089** 0.011 Accepted 
H7b Financial distress Going concern audit opinion 0.094*** 0.008 Accepted 
H8a Audit fee Auditor switching 0.107*** 0.003 Accepted 
H8b Audit fee Going concern audit opinion -0.052* 0.091 Accepted 
H9a Company growth Auditor switching 0.033** 0.020 Accepted 
H9b Company growth Going concern audit opinion 0.088** 0.012 Accepted 
H10 Opini audit going concern Auditor switching 0.047* 0.100 Accepted 
 
*** p< 0.01 
**   p< 0.05 
*     p< 0.10 
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Table AVII (continued) 
Indirect Effect 
Direct effect Indirect effect   Changes  Conclusion 
        β-value and  
        p-value  
KAPASW KAPGCR GCRASW KAPASW   
β p β p β p β p KAPASW H1c: partial 
-0.169 <0.001 -0.033 0.100 0.047 0.100 -0.171 <0.001 β-value 
increases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
CMPASW CMPGCR GCRASW CMPASW   
β p β p β p β p CMPASW H2c: partial 
-0.107 0.003 -0.049 0.100 0.047 0.100 -0.109 0.004 β-value 
increases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
ADYASW ADYGCR GCRASW ADYASW   
β p β p β p β p ADYASW H3c: partial 
-0.095 0.008 -0.028 0.040 0.047 0.100 -0.096 0.007 β-value 
increases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
ATNASW ATNGCR GCRASW ATNASW   
β p β p β p β p ATNASW H4c: partial 
-0.244 <0.001 -0.061 0.050 0.047 0.100 -0.247 <0.001 β-value 
increases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
OPNASW OPNGCR GCRASW OPNASW   
β p β p β p β p OPNASW H5c: full 
0.062 0.050 -0.514 <0.001 0.047 0.100 0.038 0.110 β-value 
decreases 
mediation 
        and becomes  
        insignificant  
OPSASW OPSGCR GCRASW OPSASW   
β p β p β p β p OPSASW H6c: partial 
0.245 <0.001 0.103 0.004 0.047 0.100 0.250 <0.001 β-value 
increases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
FDSASW FDSGCR GCRASW FDSASW   
β p β p β p β p FDSASW H7c: partial 
-0.089 0.011 0.094 0.008 0.047 0.100 -0.085 0.015 β-value 
decreases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
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Table AVII (continued) 
Indirect Effect 
Direct effect Indirect effect   Changes  Conclusion 
        β-value and  
        p-value  
FEEASW FEEGCR GCRASW FEEASW   
β p β p β p β p FEEASW H8c: partial 
0.107 0.003 -0.052 0.091 0.047 0.100 0.105 0.004 β-value 
decreases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
GWHASW GWHGCR GCRASW GWHASW   
β p β p β p β p GWHASW H9c: partial 
0.033 0.020 0.088 0.012 0.047 0.100 0.037 0.071 β-value 
increases 
mediation 
        and still  
        significant  
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Appendix 7 
Figure I 
Research Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description: 
*** p< 0.01 
**   p< 0.05                                                                                                                                                                                  
*     p< 0.10 
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